Multireceiver authentication codes allow one sender to construct an authenticated message for a group of receivers such that each receiver can verify authenticity of the received message. In this paper, we give a formal denition of multireceiver authentication codes, derive information theoretic and combinatorial lower bounds on their performance and give new e cient and exible constructions for such codes. Finally we extend the basic model to the case that multiple messages are sent and the case that the sender can be any member of the group.
Introduction
Multireceiver authentication codes (MRA-codes) are introduced by Desmedt, Frankel and Yung (DFY) 6] as an extension of Simmons' model of unconditionally secure authentication 18]. In an MRA-code, a sender wants to authenticate a message for a group of receivers such that each receiver can verify authenticity of the received message. The receivers are not trusted and may try to construct fraudulent messages on behalf of the transmitter. If the fraudulent message is acceptable by even one receiver the attackers have succeeded. This is a useful extension of traditional authentication codes and has numerous applications. For example a director wanting to give instructions to employees in an organisation such that each employee is able to verify authenticity of the message. Providing such service using digital signature implies that security is based on unproven assumptions and the attackers have nite amount of computational resources. In this paper, we will be only concerned with the unconditionally secure model, that is, there is no computational assumptions or limitations on the attackers' resources.
A multireceiver A-code can be trivially constructed using traditional A-codes: the sender shares a common key with each receiver and to send an authenticated Support for this project was partly provided by Australian Research Council Grant A49703076. message, constructs n codewords, one for each receiver, concatenates them and broadcasts the result. Now each receiver can verify its own codeword and so authenticate the message. In this construction collaboration of even n ? 1 receivers does not enable them to construct a message that is acceptable by the n th receiver simply because the n codewords are independently constructed. If we assume that the size of the malicious groups cannot be too large, for example the biggest number of collaborators is w ? 1 (w < n), then we can expect to save on the size of the key and the length of the codeword because codewords can have dependencies. This is the basic motivation of studying MRA-codes that are more e cient than the trivial one described above. DFY gave two constructions for (w; n) MRA-codes based on polynomials over nite elds and nite geometries. DFY description of MRA-code is basically an operational description of the system, that is the way the system works. Kurosawa and Obana (KO) 13] studied (w; n) MRA-code, again using the operational description of these codes, derived combinatorial lower bounds on the probability of success in impersonation and substitution attacks, and characterised Cartesian MRA-codes that satisfy the bound with equality. They showed that DFY polynomial construction is in fact an optimal (smallest sizes of transmitter and receiver keys) construction.
In this paper we start by giving a formal de nition of an MRA-code and use it to derive information theoretic bounds on the probability of success in impersonation and substitution attack against a single receiver for a general MRA-code. These bounds are used to obtain lower bounds on the the number of keys of transmitter and receivers, and also lower bound on the length of the transmitted codeword in terms of deception probability of the system. This is followed by a review of the known constructions of MRA-codes, pointing out their shortcomings and giving constructions that alleviate these shortcomings. Finally we discuss two extensions of MRA-codes, codes for multiple message transmissions and codes with dynamic senders, and give constructions for each. In the concluding section we propose possible extensions for this work.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides basic de nitions and reviews known results. In section 3 we de ne MRA-codes and derive information theoretic and combinatorial bounds. In section 4 we rst review DFY polynomial construction and then propose a more exible construction by combining an arbitrary A-code with a cover-free family. In section 5 we consider two generalisations of our basic system and give an e cient construction for each. Finally in Section 6 we summarise our results and discuss open problems. Results presented in this paper were in part presented at Eurocrypt '98.
Preliminaries
In Simmons' model of unconditionally secure authentication there are three participants: a transmitter (sender), a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter and the receiver share a secret key and are both assumed honest. The message is sent over a public channel which is subject to active attack. Transmitter and receiver use an authentication code which is a set of authentication functions f, indexed by a key belonging to a set E. To authenticate a message called a source state and denoted by s 2 S, using a key e, transmitter forms a codeword f(e; s) from a set M and sends it to the receiver who can verify its authenticity using his knowledge of the key.
De nition 2.1 An authentication code C is a 4-tuple (S; M; E; f), where f is a mapping from S E to M, f : S E ?! M such that f(s; e) = m and f(s 0 ; e) = m imply s = s 0 .
In a systematic Cartesian A-code the codeword corresponding to a source state s using e 2 E is the concatenation of s and an authentication tag t 2 T : that is m = (s; t). The receiver will detect a fraudulent codeword (s; t) if the tag that he calculates for s using his secret key e is di erent from the received tag t. The opponent can perform an impersonation, or a substitution, attack by constructing a fraudulent codeword and succeeds if the codeword is accepted by the receiver. In impersonation the attacker has not seen any previous communication while in substitution he has seen one transmitted codeword. A code provides perfect protection against impersonation if enemy's best strategy is randomly guessing a codeword. In the case of Cartesian A-codes, enemy's probability of success is P I = 1 jT j . Perfect protection for substitution is de ned in a similar way and requires enemy's best strategy to be randomly selecting one of the remaining codewords such that the source state is di erent from the observed one. For Cartesian A-codes the probability of success of the intruder is P S = 1 jT j . An extension of this model, proposed by Desmedt, Frankel and Yung (DFY) 6], is when there are multiple receivers. The system works as follows. First the key distribution centre (KDC) distributes secret keys to the transmitter and each receiver. Next the transmitter broadcasts a message to all the receivers who can individually verify authenticity of the message using their secret key information. There are malicious groups of receivers who use their secret keys and all the previous communications in the system to construct fraudulent messages. They succeed in their attack even if a single receiver accepts the message as being authentic.
KO formalisation of (w; n) MRA-codes is as follows. Let E 1 , E 2 ::; E n denote the set of decoding rules of receivers R 1 ; R n , and S and M denote the set of source states and senders codewords, respectively. We will also use X to denote a random variable de ned on a set X.
De nition 2.2 ( 13] ) We say that (S; M; E 1 ; ; E n ) is a (w; n) multireceiver Acode if for 8(E i1 ; ; E iw ) and 8(e 1 ; ; e w ), P(E iw = e w jE i1 = e 1 ; ; E iw?1 = e w?1 ) = P(E iw = e w ):
Probabilities of success in impersonation and substitution attacks, P I and P S , for (w; n) MRA-codes are then de ned as KO characterised Cartesian MRA-codes that satisfy P I = P S = 1= w p`a nd observed that DFY polynomial construction is in fact an optimal construction and has the least number of keys for the transmitter and the receivers and requires the smallest size for the authenticator. De nition 2.2 does not specify the relationship between the encoding functions of the transmitter and the receivers and only requires the independence of receivers' keys for any set of w receivers. This independence, as shown in Lemma 3.1, is su cient to ensure that the probability of success in impersonation attack by any w? 1 receivers against another receiver is the same as that by an (outside) opponent. We give a general de nition of MRA-codes in terms of commutative mappings, and for (w; n) MRA-codes only require the success probability of attackers in impersonation and/or substitution attacks to be less than one. However we do allow coalition of insiders to have higher chance of success compared to an outsider. KO's de nition of (w; n) MRA-codes corresponds to our de nition of (w; n) MRA-codes that are perfect for impersonation (see Lemma 3.1).
Model and Bounds
An MRA-System has three phases:
1. Key distribution: The KDC (key distribution centre) privately transmits the key information to the sender and each receiver (the sender can also be the KDC).
2. Broadcast: For a source state, the sender generates the authenticated message using his/her key and broadcasts the authenticated message.
3. Veri cation: Each user can verify the authenticity of the broadcast message.
Denote by X 1 X n the direct product of sets X 1 ; : : :X n , and by p i the projection mapping of X 1 X n on X i . That is, p i : X 1 X n ?! X i de ned by p i (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :; x n ) = x i . Let g 1 : X 1 ?! Y 1 and g 2 : X 2 ?! Y 2 be two mappings, we denote the direct product of g 1 and g 2 by g 1 g 2 , where g 1 g 2 : X 1 X 2 ?! Y 1 Y 2 is de ned by (g 1 g 2 )(x 1 ; x 2 ) = (g 1 (x 1 ); g 2 (x 2 )). The identity mapping on a set X is denoted by 1 X .
De nition 3.1 Let C = (S; M; E; f) and C i = (S; M i ; E i ; f i ); i = 1; 2; : : :; n, be authentication codes. We call (C; C 1 ; C 2 ; : : :; C n ) a multireceiver authentication code ( surjective. We also assume that for each code C i the probability distribution on the source states of C i is the same with that in the A-code C, and the probability distribution on E i is derived from that of E and the mapping i . Let T denote the sender and R 1 ; : : :; R n denote the n receivers. In order to authenticate a message, the sender and receivers follow the following protocol.
1. The KDC (or the sender) randomly chooses a key e 2 E and privately transmits e to T and e i = i (e) to the receiver R i , 1 i n.
2. If T wants to send a source state s 2 S to all the receivers, T computes m = f(s; e) 2 M and broadcasts it to all receivers. 3. Receiver R i checks whether a source state s such that f i (s; e i ) = i (m) exists. If such an s exists, the message m is accepted as authentic. Otherwise m is rejected.
We adopt the Kerckho 's principle that everything in the system except the actual keys of the sender and receivers is public. This includes the probability distribution of the source states and the sender's keys. From De nition 3.1 we know that the probability distribution of the sender's key induces a probability distribution on each receiver's key.
Attackers could be outsiders who do not have access to any key information, or insiders who have some key information. We only need to consider the latter group as it is at least as powerful as the former. We consider the systems that protect against the coalition of groups of up to a maximum size of receivers, and study impersonation and substitution attacks.
Assume there are n receivers R 1 ; : : :; R n . Let L = fi 1 ; : : :i`g f1; : : :; ng, E L = E i1 E i`a nd R L = fR i1 ; ; R i`g . We consider the attack from R L on a receiver R i , where i 6 2 L.
Impersonation attack: R L , after receiving their secret keys, send a message m to R i . R L is successful if m is accepted by R i as authentic. We denote by P I i; L] the success probability of R L in performing an impersonation attack on R i . This can be expressed as 
The following two bounds are generalisations of Simmons' bound 18] and Brickell's bound 4], when the attack is from a group of insiders who have access to part of the key information.
Theorem 3.1 Let P I i; L] and P S i; L] be de ned as in equation (1) Proof: The corollary follows from Theorem 3.1 by noting that
A (w; n) MRA-code is an MRA-code in which there are n receivers such that no subset of w ? 1 receivers can construct a fraudulent codeword accepted by another receiver. We note that in this de nition, the only requirement is that the chance of success of the attackers is less than one but it is possible that some coalition of attackers can have a better chance of success than an outsider.
A (w; n) MRA-code is perfect for impersonation if the chance of success of any group of up to w ?1 receivers in an impersonation attack is the same as an outsider.
Similarly, a (w; n) MRA-code is perfect for substitution if the chance of success for any group of up to w?1 receivers in a substitution attack is the same as an outsider.
Lemma 3.1 A su cient condition for a (w; n) MRA-code to be perfect for impersonation is that P(e i In the above lemma, P I i] is success probability of an outsider in impersonation attack and is given by
It should also be noted that a (w; n) MRA-code which is perfect for impersonation is not necessarily perfect for substitution. Let (C; C i ; : : :; C n ) be an MRA-code. De ne P I and P S as follows.
where maximum is taken over all possible w-subsets L fig (i 6 2 L) of f1; 2; : : :; ng.
In other words, P I and P S are the best chance of a group of w?1 receivers to succeed in impersonation or substitution attacks against a single receiver, respectively.
We de ne the deception probability of a (w; n) MRA-system as P D = maxfP I ; P S g. Theorem 3.2 Let (C; C 1 ; : : :; C n ) be a (w; n) MRA-code. Assume that P D 1=q
and there is a uniform probability distribution on the source states S. Then (ii) Assume that L i = f1; : : :; i ? 1; i + 1; : : :; wg; i = 1; : : :; w. We have, ( 1 q ) w : Since S is assumed to be uniformly distributed, we know that H(MjE) = H(S) = log jSj. Hence jMj = 2 log jMj 2 H(M) q w jSj, which proves (iii).
The bounds are tight as it is easy to verify that they are satis ed by the DFY polynomial construction. In this construction (brie y recalled in the next section), we have P D = 1=q, jE i j = q 2 , for all 1 i n, jEj = q 2w and jMj = q w jSj and so the lower bounds are satis ed with equality.
2
Comparison of the bounds with KO's bounds: Theorem 3.2 gives combinatorial bounds on the size of the transmitter's and receivers' key spaces for general (w; n) MRA-codes with or without secrecy when probability of deception is known. It also lower bounds the required redundancy in terms of the deception probabilities.
KO derived a similar set of bounds (Theorem 9, 10, 11 in 13]) which only apply to (w; n) MRA-codes without secrecy that are perfect for impersonation. In Appendix II we give a detailed comparison of the two sets of bounds.
Constructions

DFY Polynomial Construction
In 6], Desmedt, Frankel and Yung gave two constructions for MRA-codes: one is based on polynomials and the other based on nite geometries. We brie y review DFY's polynomial construction because generalisations of this scheme will be discussed in later sections of this paper. Details of the geometric construction can be found in 6].
Assume there is a sender T, and n receivers R 1 ; : : :; R n . DFY polynomial scheme works as follows. The key for T consists of two random polynomials P 0 (x) and P 1 (x), each of degree at most w?1, with coe cients in GF(q), where q > maxfjSj; ng. The key for R i consists of P 0 (i) and P 1 (i). For a source state s 2 GF(q), T broadcasts ; and jMj = q w jSj:
Hence the bounds in Theorem 3.2 can be achieved with equality. A trivial construction for MRA-codes, as mentioned in the introduction, requires the sender to store many key bits and produces a long tag for the authenticated message. DFY scheme signi cantly reduces the size of the key storage and the length of the authentication tag. However the order of the eld GF(q) must be chosen bigger than the size of the source space and the number of the receivers. In fact q, which can be thought of as the security parameter of the system, (P I = P S = 1=q), determines the size of the key storage and the length of the authentication tag. This makes the construction very restrictive because although it is acceptable to have the key storage, and length of the tag, a function of the security parameter of the system, but having the number of receivers and the size of the source bounded by it, is not reasonable. In particular when the size of the source or the number of the receivers are very large, P I and P S will be unnecessarily small and the key storage of the sender and the receivers, together with the length of the authentication tag will become prohibitively large.
In practice, we may deal with the scenarios where we are satis ed with deception probabilities higher than 1=q, but have limitation on key storage or communication bandwidth. So it is desirable to look for constructions that can cater for such tradeo s. In Section 4.2 we will give a construction that accommodates this situation. CFFs were introduced by Erd os et al in 8] and 9], further implicitly studied by Fujii, Kachen and Kurosawa in 11] in connection with MRA-codes. An (n; w; 2) CFF is exactly a Sperner family. A trivial CFF is the family consisting of single element subsets, in which case n = m. Non-trivial CFFs are those with n > m. A good CFF is one that for given m and w, n is large. Finding good CFFs with the largest possible n is believed to be a hard combinatorial problem 7] . Construction of CFFs employs various areas of mathematics such as nite geometry, design theory and probability theory, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Assume that (X; F) is an (n; m; w) CFF and (S; T ; E; f) is an A-code without secrecy. We construct a (w; n) MRA-code as follows Assume that the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks for the underlying A-code, C, is P I and P S , respectively, and let = minfjB 0 nB 1 B w?1 j; for all B 0 ; : : :; B w?1 2 Fg. Theorem 4.1 The above scheme is a (w; n) MRA-code and the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks are (P I ) and (P S ) , respectively. The proof of the theorem is straightforward. In this scheme the sender is required to store mdlog jEje bits, and the receiver R i to store jB i jdlogjEje bits. The authentication tag is of size mdlog jT je.
In 11], Fujii, Kachen and Kurosawa gave a de nition of broadcast authentication which can be seen as a special case of DFY de nition of MRA systems. Fujii et al also gave a construction for their broadcast authentication system which is a special case of the above construction, when the cover-free family has constant block size; that is jB i j = c; i = 1; : : :; n.
An important property of this construction is that it allows a complex system, such as a (w; n) MRA-code, to be constructed from two simpler ones, an A-code and a cover-free family, such that the security of the former can be described in terms of the properties and parameters of the latter. Another advantage of this construction is its exibility in choosing system parameters. That is w and n are determined by the cover-free family while P I and P S are determined by the A-code and the cover-free family and so it is possible to x w and n but change the A-code to obtain MRA-codes that provide the required protection. The following examples compare this construction with that of DFY polynomial scheme.
Example 4.1 Assume that the size of the source state is only one bit (for example, yes and no) and we need a (2; 70) MRA-code with the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks not greater than 1=2. Using DFY polynomial scheme we need a nite eld GF(q) with q 70; it follows that dlog qe 7, and so the sender must store at least 28 bits and each receiver must store at least 14 bits. The length of the authentication tag is at least 14 bits, and the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks are ( . Applying our scheme, the sender and each receiver need to store only 16 bits and 8 bits, respectively. The length of authentication tag is of 8 bits and the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks are both 1/2. bits while the probability of impersonation and substitution attacks is not greater that 1=2 2 20 . In many applications the deception probability of around 1=2 20 is an acceptable security level. Consider an A-code that is constructed from a universal hashing family (see 22]) with the following parameter: 2 20 bits of source state, 445 bits of authentication key, 20 bits of authentication tag and the probability of impersonation and substitution attacks is not greater than 1=2 19 . Combining with the (70; 8; 2) CFF, our construction results in a (2; 70) MRA-code in which the key storages for the sender and each receiver are 3560 bits and 1780 bits, respectively. The length of the authentication tag is 160 bits and the deception probability is bounded by 1=2 19 .
We note that this construction is only suitable for the case when the number of malicious receivers, compared to the total number of the receivers, is not very large. This is due to the following result. Lemma 4.1 ( 9] ) In a non-trivial (n; m; w) CFF, w(w?1) 2 n:
In 7], using probabilistic methods the authors proved that for small w, there exist (n; O(logn); w) CFFs . Finally, we point out that in general the constructions based on CFFs do not provide MRA-codes that are perfect for impersonation or substitution.
Generalisations
The basic MRA-code can be generalised in a number of ways. In this section we look at two possible generalisations.
MRA-codes for multiple message transmissions
In the basic model of MRA-codes, security analysis is for a single message transmission (only impersonation and substitution attacks are considered) and for a second message no protection is guaranteed. To provide protection for multiple message transmission one possibility is to use a new key after each message is broadcasted. This is a very ine cient solution both in terms of going through a key distribution phase after each message and the amount of key information required for each message. In the following section we propose systems that use a single key distribution phase for multiple message transmission, and compared to using a new key require less key information per communicated message.
Generalised DFY scheme for multiple messages
Assume messages are all distinct and t < jSj. The scheme consists of the following steps:
1. Key distribution: The KDC randomly generates t + 1 polynomials P 0 (x); P 1 (x); : : :; P t (x) of degree at most w ? 1 and chooses n distinct elements x 1 ; x 2 ; ; x n of GF(q). KDC makes x i 's public and sends privately (P 0 (x); P 1 (x); ; P t (x)) to the sender T, and (P 0 (x i ); P 1 (x i ); ; P t (x i )) to the receiver R i .
2. Broadcast: For a source state s, T computes A s (x) = P 0 (x) + sP 1 (x) + + s t P t (x) and broadcasts (s; A s (x)).
3. Veri cation: R i accepts (s; A s (x)) as authentic if A s (x i ) = P 0 (x i )+sP 1 (x i )+ + s t P t (x i ).
Theorem 5.1 17] The above scheme is a (w; n) MRA-code in which every key can be used to authenticate up to t messages.
To authenticate t consecutive messages, using basic DFY scheme, 2t polynomials are required while in the above scheme we only need t + 1 polynomials. So the key storage for the sender and receivers are (t + 1)wdlogqe bits and (w + 1)dlog qe bits, respectively, and are reduced to around half of that of DFY scheme. The length of the authentication tag for both constructions are the same and equal to twdlog qe bits.
Using Cover-Free Family Construction
To extend the construction of Section 4.2 to support multiple messages it is only required to replace the underlying A-code by an A-code that provides protection against spoo ng of order t, t > 1. In an spoo ng of order t attack on an A-code, the enemy has access to t authenticated codewords and wants to constructs a fraudulent one. An A-code provides perfect protection against spoo ng of order t if enemy's best strategy is randomly selecting one of the remaining codewords. It is straightforward to see that in the construction given in Section 4.2, using an A-code that provides protection against spoo ng of order t ensures that probability of success in spoo ng of order t (which can be de ned similar to A-codes) is equal to (P t ) , where P t is the probability of success in spoo ng of order t for the A-code used in the construction.
By replacing the underlying A-code with a Wegman-Carter type construction 1] one can obtain an MRA-code for multiple authentication using universal hash functions.
MRA-codes with dynamic sender
An interesting extension of the model of MRA-code is when the sender is not xed and can be any member of the group. In this case key distribution is by a Trusted Authority (TA) who is only active during key distribution phase. We call the system MRA-code with dynamic sender. There are many applications for such systems. For example providing authentication in group communication where members of a group want to broadcast messages such that every other group member can verify the authenticity of the received messages. It is worth noting that providing authentication in group communication is much more di cult than providing con dentiality because in the former group members can participate in coordinated attack against other group members while in the latter protection is only provided against outsider's eavesdropping.
Allowing the sender to be dynamic introduces the notion of authenticating with respect to a particular identity. That is, to verify authenticity of a received message a receiver must rst assume an identity for the sender and then verify the message with respect to this particular sender. An authenticated message in general carries information that indicates its origin, together with its content information and hence the system must provide origin (entity) authentication and message authentication both. In other words the success of an attacker(s) could be by replacing the identity information, or the message content.
The Model
In the model of MRA-code with dynamic sender, there are n users P = fP 1 ; : : :; P n g, who want to communicate over a broadcast channel. The channel is subject to spoo ng attack: that is a codeword can be inserted into the channel or, a transmitted codeword can be substituted with a fraudulent one. An attack is directed towards a channel, consisting of a pair of users fP i ; P j g, P i as the sender and P j as the receiver. A spoofer might be an outsider, or a coalition of w ? 1 users. The aim of the spoofer(s) is to construct a codeword that P j accepts as being sent from P i . We assume that the TA is only active during key distribution phase. The system has three phases. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that after the key distribution phase, each user can only send at most a single authenticated message.
>From the above de nition, we make the following observations. 1. In a (w; n) MRA-code with dynamic sender during the key distribution phase, the TA does not know which user is going to broadcast. That is there are n users and everyone of them could be a sender. 2. A (w; n) MRA-code with dynamic sender is a (w 0 ; n) MRA-code with dynamic sender for any w 0 w. 3. We assume that a message is sent only once by a single sender. So a possible attack is to change the origin information of codeword and leave the message content intact. A straightforward construction based on conventional A-codes is to give each pair of users, fP i ; P j g , a shared secret key. Note that now a user can generate the authenticators for a message using the secret keys he shares with all P j s, and broadcast the concatenation of them. In this case there are n(n?1)=2 pairs of users, which means that a user has to store (n ? 1) keys, and the TA has to generate and store (n ? 1)n=2 keys. The disadvantages of this scheme are the large amount of keys stored by each user, together with the long tag for the authenticated message. Our aim is to give more e cient constructions which reduce the key management of both the TA and the users, and reduce the authenticator size, compared to this trivial scheme.
Lower Bounds
To de ne P I and P S in an MRA-code with dynamic sender, we note that because every user can be a sender, when a message is received by a user P i , she/he must rst assume an identity for the sender and then verify the authenticity of the message with respect to the assumed identity. The enemy is a set of w ? 1 malicious users, P l1 ; : : :; P lw?1 , who attack a pair of other users. For example, targeting the pair fP i ; P j g, results in P j accepting a fraudulent messages as being sent from P i .
In impersonation attack, P l1 ; : : :; P lw?1 collude and try to launch an attack against a pair of users P i and P j , by generating a message such that P j accepts it as authentic and being sent from P i . We denote the success probability in this case by P I m; i; j; L], where L = fP l1 ; : : :; P lw?1 g. P I is the best probability of success in such attacks and is de ned by P I = max fL;i;jg max m P I m; i; j; L];
where L fi; jg runs through all (w + 1)-subsets of f1; 2; : : :; ng.
In the substitution attack, there are two distinct cases. 1. Message substitution: After seeing a valid message m broadcasted by P i , the users fP l1 ; : : :; P lw?1 g construct a new message m 0 (m 6 = m 0 ) such that P j will accept m 0 as being sent >from P i . We denote the success probability in this case by P S m; m 0 ; i; j; L], and the best probability of such an attack is denoted by P Smessage , P Smessage = max where L fi; i 0 ; jg runs through all (w + 2)-subsets of f1; 2; : : :; ng. Now the probability of success in the substitution attack for the whole system is de ned as P S = maxfP Smessage ; P Sentity g: Theorem 5.2 In a (w; n) MRA-code with dynamic sender, assume that P I = P S 1=q and assume there is a uniform probability distribution on the source states S. ; for each i 2 f1; 2; : : :; ng; (ii) jM i j q w jSj; for each i 2 f1; 2; : : :; ng; where E i is the set of possible keys of P i and M i is the set of possible codewords when P i is a sender, for all i 2 f1; 2; : : :; ng. These are tight bounds and there exists a system that satis es them with equality.
Proof: For each i; 1 i n, P i is a possible sender and so the (w; n) MRAsystem with dynamic sender induces a (w; n?1) MRA-code, in which the probability of success in impersonation and substitution attacks are both 1=q. By applying Theorem 3.2, we obtain the required results. In Section 5.2.3 we will show that the bounds are tight by giving a construction that meets them. 
An optimal construction
Now we give a construction for a (w; n) MRA-code with dynamic sender, which is based on symmetric polynomials in two variables. In 17] a (w; n) MRA-code with dynamic sender using Blom's key distribution scheme is proposed. The following construction is a slightly modi ed version of the construction given in 17]. We show that the construction has the minimumlength of keys for users and the authenticator, and meets the bounds in Theorem 5.2 with equality. We rst brie y review Blom key distribution scheme.
Blom key distribution scheme Let q n be a prime power. The TA randomly chooses a symmetric polynomial, F(x; y), with coe cients in GF(q) and of degree less than w. For 1 i n, the TA computes the polynomial G i (x) = F(x; i) and gives G i (x) to user P i , i.e., G i (x) is the secret information of P i . The key associated with the pair of users P i and P j is calculated as, k ij = G i (j) = G j (i). It is proved 2] that the scheme is unconditionally secure against the collusion of w ? 1 users in the following sense: the coalition of any w ? 1 out of n users, say P i1 ; : : :; P iw 1 , has no information about the key k ij for the pair i; j; where i; j 6 2 fi 1 ; : : :; i w g.
(w; n) MRA-code with dynamic sender based on Blom's scheme
The (w; n) MRA-code with dynamic sender based on the Blom's scheme, works as follows. Let S be the set of source states and q maxfjSj; ng be a prime power.
1. Key distribution: The TA chooses n distinct numbers a i in GF(q) (associate a i to user P i , 1 i n). These values are public and are used as identity information for users. Then the TA randomly chooses 2 symmetric polynomials of degree less than w with coe cients in GF(q), and gives the 2-tuple of polynomials, (G 0i (x); G 1i (x)), to user P i . This constitutes the secret information of P i .
2. Broadcast: For 1 i n, assume that the user P i wants to generate the authenticated message for a source state s 2 S. P i computes the polynomial M i (x) = G 0i (x) + sG 1i (x) and broadcasts (s; a i ; M i (x)).
3. Veri cation: The user P j can verify the authenticity of the message in the following way. P j accepts (s; a i ; M i (x)) as authentic and being sent from P i if M i (a j ) = G 0j (a i ) + sG 1j (a i ).
Theorem 5.3 The above scheme is a (w; n) MRA-code with dynamic sender with P I = P S = 1=q:
Proof: Assume that after seeing an authenticated message (s; a i ; M i (x)) broadcasted by the user P i , the users P 
We claim that in the equations (4) and (5) 
Indeed, consider the symmetric polynomial, where A is a w w symmetric matrix and A 6 = 0. We de ne A 0 = ?sA and A 1 = A, then it is not di cult to verify that (A 0 ; A 1 ) satis es the desired properties.
We note that since (?sA; A) satisfy the equations (6), and (7), so is (?rsA; rA) for all r 2 GF(q). This implies that there are q distinct 2-tuple symmetric polynomials which are equally likely to be chosen by the TA. Then it is straightforward to verify that d = 0 if and only if r = 0. This is equivalent to that the q distinct possible 2-tuple polynomials (F 0 (x; y); F 1 (x; y)) chosen by the TA result in q distinct values of the form F 0 (a i ; a j ) + s 0 F 1 (a i ; a j ). Therefore the probability of message substitution attack P Smessage is 1=q. Similarly, we can prove P Sentity = P I = 1=q. 
Conclusions
Multireceiver authentication is an important cryptographic primitive in secure group communication. In this paper, we formally de ned MRA-codes and derived information theoretic and combinatorial lower bounds on their performance. We reviewed other works in this area and showed their relations to our work. We have presented an e cient and exible construction for MRA-codes by combination of a cover-free family and an A-code. This construction generalises an earlier work by Fujii, Kachen and Kurosawa. We also generalised Desmedt, Frankel and Yung (DFY) polynomial construction for multiple messages transmission. Finally, we introduced the model of multireceiver authentication code with dynamic sender, derived combinatorial bounds for key and message sizes of such a system, and gave an optimal construction that meets the bounds with equality. Deriving information theoretic bound for MRA systems with dynamic senders, and construction of systems with more than one dynamic sender are interesting open problems. Another important direction to generalise this work is to require MRA systems to provide secrecy against outsiders. Study of MRA systems so far has been in the context of systems without secrecy. Requiring secrecy of broadcasted message can also be seen as adding authenticity to the known model of broadcast encryption 10]. This means that we require general multireceiver systems that reduce to MRA-codes and broadcast encryption systems when only authenticity, or only secrecy, is required. A successful generalisation will extend the known model of MRA-code by imposing an access structure on the set of receivers such that only the authorised set of receivers can verify authenticity of messages.
Proof of Theorem 3. For given L f1; : : :; ng and i 6 2 L, let P(m; e i ; e L ) be the joint probability distri- We introduce a random variable M 0 which only takes values when S (m 0 ; m; e i ; e L ) = 1. It follows that there is a joint probability distribution P(m 0 ; m; e i ; e L ) such that P(m; e i ; e L ) is the probability distribution given in the system and such We show that our Theorem 3.2 (iii) implies that P D = maxfP I ; P S g 1 w p`:
